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Usefulness of consolidated government accounts: A comparative study 
 
 
Abstract  
This comparative empirical study on consolidated government accounting reforms in the United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Sweden reveals contextual differences affecting their 
adoption and usefulness. It can help policy makers, public managers, and academics understand the 
gap between claims associated with the adoption of accounting technologies and their usefulness, as 
well as provide insights into dichotomies between their global proliferation and localized adaptations. 
 
Key words: consolidated government accounts; accruals accounting; New Public Management; United 
Kingdom; Australia; New Zealand; Canada; Sweden 
 
 
Introduction 
Nearly three decades since the advent of New Public Management (NPM) in the 1990s, governments 
in many Western nations remain interested in accruals-based accounting and budgeting reforms 
(Robinson, 1998; Likierman, 2003; Paulsson, 2006; Lapsley et al., 2009; Ezzamel, et al., 2014). More 
recently, research interest has branched out to also examine reforms closely related to accruals, such 
as consolidated government accounts, that bring together the public sector in a single set of audited 
financial statements (Chow et al., 2007; Grossi and Pepe, 2009; Newberry and Pont-Newby, 2009; 
Newberry, 2011; Bergmann, 2014; Chow et al., 2015; Bergmann et al., 2016). In particular, there 
continues to be strong academic and practitioner interest in understanding the usefulness of 
government accounting reforms (Ezzamel, et al., 2014; Kober et al., 2010; Lapsley et al., 2009; Barton, 
2009; Chow et al., 2015). Given significant investments in time and cost in developing such systems, 
and their potential to transform the nature of governmental accountability, the need to evaluate the 
value of such reforms remains important and timely. 
 
Governments worldwide have experimented with accruals-based consolidated government accounts 
since accounting-based reforms were popularized in New Zealand (NZ) and Australia in the late 1980s. 
Reformers in these countries heralded accruals-based consolidation as a technology that can deliver 
significant benefits to its users. In NZ, consolidated government accounts were sold as a key 
technology within wider NPM reforms, for which NZ was considered a leader (Pallot and Ball, 1996). 
It has been proclaimed that they would enable better financial and economic management, by 
showing “the real significance and breadth of the role of government” (Ball, 1981, p. 26), facilitating 
better fiscal discipline and longer-term economic planning.  
 
Proponents of consolidation argue that its implementation represents a logical next step in expanding 
accruals accounting reforms in government. For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK), the Whole of 
Government Accounts (WGA-UK) programme is said to extend the usefulness of accruals-based 
accounts and budgets by consolidating the entire public sector, which would “provide new 
information for macroeconomic management and the development of fiscal policy” (Likierman, 2003, 
p. 49). But the pace and scale of reform differs significantly by country, despite a growing consensus 
around consolidated government accounts. Canada, despite early interest in developing a 
consolidated government accounts framework (Dye and Bowsher, 1987), did not explicitly label the 
federal government accounts as “consolidated government accounts” until 2012. It was a nominal 
change only after ten years of accruals-based government-wide financial reporting. Consolidation 
therefore appears to be taken for granted as a natural or self-evident development of accruals 
accounting reforms due to its strong normative appeal as being an economic reflection of the entity 
(Bergmann et al., 2016). However, expanding the scale of reforms on the basis of normative logic 
alone is problematic. This is because it assumes that accounting-led changes can indefinitely be 
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extended in their scope and complexity (Lapsley et al., 2009). Further, Rutherford (1992) and Young 
(2006) question whether normative conceptualizations of users and usefulness are reflective of real 
world difficulties in identifying actual users. 
 
Claims for expanding accruals accounting reforms to include full consolidation are often based on 
arguments borrowed from the private sector and extended to the public sector. Its main stated aims 
have been to improve transparency, comparability, and accountability, as well as operational 
efficiency (Chow et al., 2009). Ball and Pflugrath (2012) view it as necessary for understanding the 
economic reality facing governments, improving resource allocation decisions, and resolving 
sovereign debt crises. Likierman (2003) claims that the realized benefits include better asset and cash 
management and more accurate costing amongst others. Furthermore, for Robinson (1998), 
consolidation can be used to develop sustainable and inter-generationally fair fiscal policy.  
 
The growing trend for consolidation practices in government has also piqued academic interest. 
Coming from a stakeholder theory perspective, Bergmann et al. (2016) argue that full consolidation is 
important for both internal (e.g., politicians and public managers), as well as external stakeholders 
(e.g., citizens, financial institutions and rating agencies), because it provides a fuller, whole of entity, 
perspective on the government’s financial position and performance, due to otherwise significant 
exclusions of agencies contributing to government activity (Heald and Georgiou, 2000; 2009). Others 
(Ball, 2012; Ball and Pflugrath, 2012; Grossi and Pepe, 2009) view reforms based on private sector 
practices and international harmonization favourably, persuaded mainly by perceived economic 
benefits. But there are also voices calling for more evidence that such reforms work. Chow et al. (2007) 
argue that the grand claims of transparency, accountability, and comparability need to be evidenced. 
Others have also reported practical and conceptual challenges in, and exaggerated benefits of, 
importing private sector techniques into the public sector (Wall and Connolly, 2016; Barton, 2009), as 
well as technical challenges related to measurement and boundary issues (Heald and Georgiou, 2011). 
From a financial analysis perspective, Newberry (2011) reports on the lack of transparency from the 
macro-aggregation of consolidated figures, obscuring the effects of privatization.  
 
The persistent appeal of historic ex-post accounting systems, as opposed to forward-looking ex-ante 
decision tools remains puzzling, as reformers continue to advocate for these technologies despite 
their lack of actual use by public sector decision makers (Jones et al., 2013). Evidence to date indicates 
that they are not actually used as intended, and that promised benefits have not materialized in ways 
intended (e.g., Chow et al., 2015). However, current research on comparative country studies 
continues to be limited by a lack of both scale and analytical depth (Jones et al., 2013). In particular, 
there is a dearth of comparative empirical consolidation studies in countries with advanced reforms, 
apart from a practitioner-oriented report by Chow et al. (2015) that focuses on the local issues within 
the individual countries studied. Given the significant sharing of ideas amongst such countries, there 
is an urgent need for an international comparative perspective on differences between national 
interpretations of usefulness of consolidated government accounts. This study contributes by 
analysing the application and usefulness of consolidated government accounts in five Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.  
 
 
Literature review  
The extant literature on accruals accounting reforms reveals different and seemingly contradictory 
definitions of usefulness and difficulties in identifying primary users. Rutherford (1992) argues that 
users of government financial statements are either defined normatively (a priori reasoning) or 
positively (through empirical methods identifying actors and how they use the statements). He notes 
that conceptual frameworks tend to take a normative approach when defining external users as 
taxpayers, voters, service recipients and investors in government securities. However, the interests of 
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these ‘users’ are often not properly served by general purpose financial statements due to their 
heterogeneous needs, reinforced by empirical (positive) studies that struggle to identify individuals 
external to the organization “who could be held to use financial statements for any purpose” 
(Rutherford, 1992, p. 269, emphasis original). The UK government’s own analysis on the usefulness of 
consolidated government accounts in other countries, published in a scoping study (HM Treasury, 
1998) prior to the introduction of UK Whole of Government Accounts (WGA) in 2010, also 
(unexpectedly) came to a similar conclusion. The scoping study reported vague assertions over the 
usefulness of consolidated government accounts for policy-making. NZ claims that it is useful (but 
unable to say how), in Canada discussion of benefits focus on a greater awareness of government 
operating costs, while for Australia and Sweden, such information is not used for policy decisions (HM 
Treasury, 1998). The broad conclusion drawn from the scoping study is an awareness of the 
heterogeneity of international approaches to the usefulness of consolidated government accounts 
and (lingering) ambiguity over how they are used in government policies.  
 
As the ability to compare within an entity and across entities is what makes accounting reports useful 
to decision makers, significant differences in national accounting standards can undermine the 
usefulness of consolidated government accounts. Alignment, adoption or harmonization of standards 
is therefore a central preoccupation of reformers. A key debate in this regard centres on the choice of 
standards to implement, whether the reforming public sector chooses to develop its own standards 
that are in close alignment with the private sector, or jointly (or unilaterally) adopts ‘sector-neutrality’, 
with a common set of standards covering both private and public entities (Ellwood and Newberry, 
2016). To improve usefulness, Walker (2009) argues for the need to re-evaluate the typical control 
test used to define consolidation boundaries and to improve the alignment, especially between 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice/Principles (GAAP) consolidated government accounts and 
statistical systems. 
 
Using extant accounting systems has significant advantages. As International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) already exists for the private sector, they appeal to some governments from a 
legitimacy standpoint (Walker, 2009), despite reservations over the appropriateness of the public 
sector adopting private sector concepts (Barton, 2009; Rutherford, 1992). For example, Australia 
decided to move towards sector neutrality (IFRS) for the public sector in 2005, as their 
parliamentarians struggled to interpret dual bottom line reports (Barton, 2009). These financial 
statements originally reported on both a GAAP and Global Finance Statistics (GFS) basis, but the 
contradictory out-turns were deemed too confusing for parliamentarians and other non-expert users. 
In contrast, the NZ public sector moved to the International Public Sector Accounting Standards 
(IPSAS), after auditors criticized the government for modifications made to IFRS for public entities 
(Cordery and Simpkins, 2016). In Canada, national public sector standards have always been different 
from private sector standards (except for recent adoption of IFRS for government business entities), 
while Sweden significantly deviates from IPSAS principles. 
 
The current literature on users and usefulness of accounting (Kober et al., 2010; Ezzamel et al., 2014; 
Hyndman, 2016) mainly focus on how accruals and accounting vs performance information (van 
Helden, 2016) are used, but do not evaluate information generated from consolidated accounts per 
se (Newberry, 2011 and HM Treasury, 1998, are exceptions). Kober et al. (2010) reported that, for 
most purposes, GAAP-based accruals information was perceived to be more useful than statistical 
information in Australia, particularly by those with private sector experience. Internal users were more 
likely to rate GAAP as more useful, whereas external users were indifferent. With two-thirds of Kober 
et al.’s respondents having an accounting background, applicability of their results to other structural, 
political, and cultural contexts remains largely unknown. Studies on consolidated government 
accounts (e.g., Bergmann et al., 2016; Grossi and Pepe, 2009; Heald and Georgiou, 2011) mainly 
explicate the potential (normative) benefits for adoption, but some have also revealed inconsistencies 
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in defining control criteria and other accounting measures (e.g., Walker, 2009). Related research is 
further complicated by claims that users are difficult to reliably identify and define, leading standard 
setters to construct users (Young, 2006). Chow et al. (2015) attempted to address the issue of 
misaligned normative versus empirical expectations of usefulness in a comparative international study 
that examines how consolidated government accounts are used. They reported on the difficulties that 
key stakeholders such as parliamentarians and/or credit ratings agencies face in the UK, Australia, and 
NZ when trying to use consolidated government accounts for policy making. Their analyses of Canada 
and Sweden also reveal limited usefulness of consolidated government accounts, as other accounting 
systems are used for policy decisions. 
 
Recent studies continue to support Rutherford’s (1992) distinction between normative and positive 
definitions of users/usefulness. These studies reveal a recurring contradiction between (rhetorical) 
claims of improved accountability, with questions over the usefulness of accruals accounting 
information and continued reliance on budgetary and statistical systems (Connolly and Hyndman, 
2006; Ezzamel et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2013; Wall and Connolly, 2016; van Helden, 2016; Heald and 
Hodges, 2015; Brusca et al., 2013). For example, the implementation of IFRS in devolved UK 
governments (Wall and Connolly, 2016) and IPSAS in Spain (Brusca et al., 2013) has had minimal effect 
on the actual use of information from GAAP-based systems by politicians. Similarly, van Helden (2016) 
and Kobayashi et al. (2016) found that politicians’ professed appreciation of accruals accounting 
information does not necessarily mean that they actually use them, as they still generally prefer cash-
based budgetary systems in policy making. Ezzamel et al. (2014) note the irony that an accounting 
reform aimed at enhancing accountability is disconnected from, and not used by, parliamentarians. 
 
Therefore, the sustained momentum for accruals accounting reforms in government, which includes 
consolidation, can reflect a desire for symbolic legitimacy by key players (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2009; 
Lapsley, 2009; Pollanen and Loiselle-Lapointe, 2012). Legitimizing behaviours have been observed in 
various jurisdictions and for different NPM-inspired accounting reforms. Key actors create the 
necessary conditions for sustaining reform momentum through legitimizing strategies (Hyndman and 
Liguori, 2016). Accounting reforms can also be legitimized through wide-scale prior acceptance of 
NPM values as norms and through their localized modifications needed to achieve buy-in (Lapsley, 
2009; Hyndman and Lapsley, 2016; Hyndman and Liguori, 2016). The focus on outputs embedded in 
such reforms often results in dysfunctional outcomes and processes, such as a compliance mentality 
at the expense of intended bona fide service improvement (Lapsley, 2009). The main issues discussed 
in this review are explored in this study and discussed in the findings section.  
 
 
Method 
The UK, Australia, NZ, Canada, and Sweden were selected because they are considered to be global 
leaders in accounting-led NPM reforms. For example, Bergmann et al. (2016) classifies them as 
countries that have the most extensive reforms, implementing not just accruals but also consolidated 
government accounting reforms (see Bergmann et al., 2016). Wall and Connolly (2016) classify them 
as countries with the highest intensity of NPM reforms and also most experienced in adopting accruals 
accounting reforms. Grossi and Pepe (2009) compared these five countries’ approaches to 
consolidated government accounts, but their study was not empirical and conducted before the 
completion of WGA-UK reforms. Accounting developments in the other four countries selected in this 
study were also important reference points for the UK. For example, before deciding on whether to 
proceed with WGA-UK, the UK government conducted an extensive comparative analysis of 
experiences with consolidation from countries such as Australia, NZ, Canada, and Sweden (HM 
Treasury, 1998).  
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Semi-structured interviews were conducted with public officials, parliamentarians, and individuals 
with standard setting and other relevant experience by a local researcher residing in each country. In 
a few cases, the lead author also travelled to other countries to conduct joint interviews. The targeted 
interviewees were purposively sampled, based on their expertise and experience in key functions. The 
interviewees represented treasury, finance, fiscal policy, accounting, comptrollership, audit, statistics, 
and parliamentary functions, and in some countries, external parties, such as credit rating agencies 
(Table 1). Citizens’ interests were assumed to be represented by parliamentary representation and 
supreme audit institutions. Due to difficulties in recruiting some types of participants (e.g., 
parliamentarians in some countries), there may be some unavoidable selection bias. Position titles, 
responsibilities, and institutional structures, which vary significantly between countries, were also 
examined, but they cannot be disclosed in order to guard anonymity of the interviewees that is 
required by the mandatory pre-approved research ethics protocols of most study countries. Some 
interviewees have requested additional privacy measures, stressing that even revealing the 
organization they work for would compromise their anonymity, given the highly specialized nature of 
their work. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Interviews were conducted between September 2014 and March 2015. The interviews were recorded 
and transcribed, except in a few cases, where consent to record was not granted and notes were taken 
instead. Two Swedish interviews were conducted in Swedish and translated into English. The 
interviewees were offered an opportunity to review transcribed interview notes for accuracy. In 
describing the findings, they are identified only by their local country abbreviation. Interview data 
were supplemented by analysis of public documents and academic and professional literature, and 
some observations, where practicable. Thus, the research method was guided by van Helden’s (2016) 
proposition that semi-structured interviews, combined with observations, are preferred methods, as 
questionnaire surveys can oversimplify complex behaviours and overestimate actual use of 
accounting information. Caperchione and Lapsley (2011) agree that qualitative methods are more 
appropriate for comparative research in governmental accounting, as quantitative approaches can be 
inadequate for capturing cultural nuances in accounting practices.  
 
 
Findings 
A number of overlapping themes emerged from the comparative analysis on usefulness, which are 
discussed in turn: challenges for global comparability due to national differences in defining 
consolidation boundaries; difficulties in identifying actual users and defining usefulness; and the 
competition that consolidation reforms face from extant systems of accounting.    
 
Variations in defining consolidation boundaries 
Global comparability requires uniformity in defining national consolidation boundaries, but long-
standing historical definitions of government boundaries pose a significant challenge to the usefulness 
of consolidated government accounts. Government boundaries have traditionally been determined 
by jurisdictional definitions of stewardship as established by constitutional law, such as central, 
provincial, regional, and local government boundaries. In contrast, consolidated government accounts 
rely on economic control to define boundaries. The rhetorical advantages in using control is clear, as 
it can discourage financial innovations (such as off-balance sheet financing) created solely for the 
purpose of obscuring the economic substance of transactions (Heald and Georgiou, 2011).  
 
The UK has the most extensive, single-tier consolidation model that incorporates not only the central 
government, but also local governments and all non-departmental public bodies, i.e., all bodies 
funded through public resources. In NZ, consolidation at the central government level is similar to the 
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UK, but local authority reports remain unconsolidated (except to the extent of the entity’s control 
within local municipality boundaries). Australia and Canada’s consolidation boundaries do not include 
consolidation at the national level, but they are disaggregated into multiple consolidation entities at 
the state/provincial and local government levels in a three-tier model, reflecting their devolved 
jurisdictional remit. Sweden also consolidates separately across two tiers at the central government 
and local government levels. In each country, however, some bodies/agencies have been exempted 
from consolidation, which further limits global comparability. 
 
In the UK, the WGA-UK programme focuses on integrating the various accounts of central and local 
governments and public corporations and was intended to be useful for both macroeconomic policy 
making and accountability reporting (Chow et al., 2007). It aimed to address political concerns, such 
as the need to improve asset maintenance, account for unfunded pension liabilities, and integrate 
accounting functions with fiscal management. On the other hand, in Australia, historical jurisdictional 
boundaries and institutional forces, rather than user needs, steered the development of whole of 
government reports (WGR-AU). Following the Financial Reporting Act (1993), NZ initially applied a 
sector neutral approach from 1993 to 2013 (before it switched to IPSAS), with the sector neutral 
consolidation standard in 2001 leading to the implementation of consolidated central government 
financial reports (WGA-NZ).  
 
In Canada, the Public Sector Accounting Board (PSAB) can only recommend accounting standards for 
the sovereign federal and provincial governments with distinct jurisdictional responsibilities, but 
municipalities are required by provincial laws to follow PSAB standards. The federal government 
financial statements were first prepared using full accruals accounting for 2001-2002, but they were 
only labelled as “consolidated” a decade later. The departments are not required to, and many still do 
not voluntarily, use full accruals accounting for departmental statements. The PSAB revised the 
control criteria for government reporting entities in 2005, but all municipalities and Ontario 
universities were exempted from provincial consolidations. In Sweden, the requirement to submit 
consolidated central government annual reports has been stipulated by law since 1996. The Swedish 
consolidation model follows the central and local government boundaries defined in the constitution. 
Each accounting entity is required to submit monthly financial information to the Swedish National 
Financial Management Authority (ESV) database.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The sheer variety of approaches in all five countries share a common element, with significant 
adaptations of the consolidation boundary to fit localized interpretations of usefulness, blending 
jurisdictional and control definitions. More generally, boundary definitions and consolidation methods 
(e.g., full consolidation or equity method) vary by jurisdiction (Bergmann et al., 2016). Table 2, building 
on Chow et al.’s (2015) comparison of boundary definitions, summarizes key related legislation and 
jurisdictionally defined consolidation boundaries (and exceptions) and the main uses (claimed and 
actual) found in this study. The next theme on identification of users extends the findings of Chow et 
al. (2015) by comparing the challenges faced by each country in making localized adaptations of 
consolidated government accounts useful. 
 
Identifying users and usefulness  
Variations in the way in which consolidation boundaries are drawn has not hindered reformers across 
all five countries from similarly defining users of consolidated government accounts. Key stakeholders 
are said to include government officials, parliamentarians, community, media, analysts, and credit 
rating agencies. However, as Young (2006) and Rutherford (1992) found, actual users can sometimes 
be quite difficult to identify and engage with. For example, AU1 felt that there is a lack of clarity over 
who the actual users of WGR-AU are. This is further exacerbated by AU1’s perception of the general 
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public’s indifference to government financial reporting initiatives, with a lack of visibility over who the 
constituent users are. AU1 explained: “I don’t feel … that the public are particularly engaged with any 
of it”. Similarly, UK1 observed that reviews by the UK Financial Reporting Advisory Board (FRAB) 
struggle to identify actual users within the government who had made decisions based on WGA-UK 
reports. In Canada, interviewees were avoiding admitting to being major users of consolidated 
government accounts by downplaying their own role while talking up that of others, making it difficult 
for a consensus to emerge.  
 
A similar discrepancy arises when considering the claims made for the usefulness of consolidated 
government accounts, with similar broadly defined claims of improved economic decision making and 
enhanced accountability. The reality, however, suggests that countries vary in the emphasis placed on 
such claims. For example, macroeconomic or fiscal policy decision making was a central focus behind 
NZ’s accounting reforms. The UK government had also made similar strong claims that WGA-UK can 
aid policy making, for example, with respect to long-term unfunded debt such as pensions (Chow et 
al., 2007), as well as, improve accountability. There is some support for this, with reformers such as 
UK2 claiming that WGA-UK has highlighted previously hidden and unaccounted for assets that had 
fallen between departmental boundaries, issues also raised by Heald and Georgiou (2000; 2011). 
Moreover, WGA-UK has benefited by serving as a catalyst for the harmonization of accounting policy 
across the UK government and provided useful measures for asset management (UK2).  
 
NZ’s accounting reforms have, however, been facilitated by its relatively small size and unique political 
and cultural climate, with close links between government, practitioners and academia all located in 
Wellington. NZ4 saw NZ as a well-governed country that is proud of its reform achievements, a country 
small and flexible enough to accomplish them, and one driven by a strong political will for reform 
(NZ1). NZ6 agreed with that synopsis, stating: “If I want to know what was going on, I could ring up 
the person running the area [and] talk to the deputy”. Despite some lingering ambiguity in NZ over 
benefits and criticisms of consolidation entity definitions (Newberry and Pont-Newby, 2009), NZ2 was 
optimistic about the potential usefulness of WGA-NZ for fiscal policy and also planning decisions. NZ4 
contended, however, that another decade of reporting is required to be able to conclude whether or 
not the reforms implemented have actually improved the quality of reporting in this sector.  
 
Compared with the UK and NZ, Canadian interviewees were more sceptical on the value of 
consolidated government accounts for uses other than accountability reporting to the Parliament. 
CA1 believes that consolidated government accounts are produced primarily for the Auditor General’s 
use, in order to assess the government’s efficacy in managing its operations, assets, and finances. The 
Federal Accountability Act (2006) is seen to have significantly improved ministerial accountability by 
bestowing formal financial management responsibilities on deputy ministers. Such legislation does 
not exist at the provincial level, and CA6 and CA4 described fierce political battles over standard-
setting authority and lobbying for exemptions from PSAB consolidation standards for provincial 
consolidations. Nonetheless, CA6 remarked that an informal cultural shift has also gradually occurred 
at other levels of government and resulted in improving the financial literacy of senior public officials 
at all levels. Like in Canada, GAAP-based consolidation in Australia was perceived mostly as a 
compliance tool, as AU2 and AU4 suggested that the media are more interested in budgets and hence 
politicians prefer to use them instead. This finding is contrary to the usefulness of GAAP-based 
accruals found by Kober et al. (2013) in a study with accounting-oriented interviewees. 
 
In Sweden, interviewees commented that the move to consolidated government accounts was not an 
original, intended aim of the government. It is instead viewed as a windfall outcome from existing 
accruals accounting reforms, as there was no prior demand for consolidation (SE1, SE2). Consolidation 
was seen as a taken-for-granted extension or by-product of accruals accounting implementation at 
the central government, for which accruals government-wide annual reports have been required by 
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law since 1996 (Paulsson, 2006). SE2 explained: “We have a history of accruals and that made it easy 
for us to transfer the rest. We had a package of rules for the accruals already set down”. According to 
SE4, a key indirect benefit of consolidated central government accounts in Sweden is that they have 
resulted in a framework for improved governance and internal control. Swedish interviewees 
considered the UK consolidation model as potentially providing a better perspective on debt. 
However, it is seen as less relevant (for Sweden) due to differences between jurisdictional and control-
based definitions of government boundaries, as the former is prioritized. 
 
Politicians face significant hurdles in trying to use consolidated government accounts. Some Members 
of Parliament (UK3, AU5) commented that those without expertise or interest in accounting reforms 
struggled to engage. For instance, UK2 remarked that parliamentarians have difficulty in 
understanding the “subtle differences between National Accounts, public sector net deficit, and WGA-
UK net liability”, echoing earlier Australian debates (Barton, 2009) on confusion caused by dual 
bottom lines. AU2 called for simplifications in the presentation of, and AU5 noted the lack of training 
and incentives for new MPs to use, WGR-AU. CA1 believes that parliamentarians need analysts to 
simplify and interpret multiple un-reconciled financial reports to improve their ability to understand 
and use consolidated reports. Interestingly, CA1 (cynically) notes that more transparent reporting can 
invite unwanted probing, reducing political incentives to champion improved usefulness. CA6 argues 
that parliamentarians need accruals-based financial reports to be linked to performance data to be 
useful for decision making. Swedish interviewees (SE1, SE2) fear that consolidation along the lines of 
the UK model could reduce the timeliness of financial reports, due to the scale and complexity of the 
boundaries.  
 
These findings add to the growing evidence (Ezzamel et al., 2014) that parliamentarians face 
significant challenges in using GAAP-based accounting reports, but it does not deny their usefulness 
for some internal users in the UK and NZ who are able to articulate observed benefits. Making them 
more accessible to elected politicians still largely remains to be seen, with competing systems 
representing a threat to the wider acceptance of consolidated government accounts, as discussed 
next. 
 
Competing systems 
A significant hurdle faced by GAAP-based reforms, as already evident in Australia, is the implicit (but 
often strong) competition with extant systems based on national statistics (e.g., GFS for Australia; 
European System of Accounts 2010, or ESA10 for UK). Despite claims that consolidated government 
accounts are appropriate for measuring the stock of government debt, interviewees (UK5, AU3) 
explain that they are generally less relevant for credit-rating evaluations, which continue to focus on 
cash flow forecasts as a proxy of entities’ ability to repay debt. These agencies instead source their 
data from national statistics, which were seen as facilitating comparability due to their widespread 
use globally. The UK government also uses National Accounts for policy and decision-making purposes, 
given that this is the system used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the OECD, as testified 
by Sir Nicholas Macpherson, a senior civil servant, to the Public Accounts Committee (2013, Q3) on 
the second WGA-UK report. Caruana (2016), in citing Heald and Georgiou (2011), notes that the UK 
government’s consolidation boundary is intentionally aligned with that of National Accounts for this 
reason.  
 
In contrast, NZ interviewees agree that WGA-NZ is sufficiently reliable and trustworthy. However, local 
authority financial reporting remains unconsolidated. Regarding its use by the government itself and 
by credit rating agencies, interviewees recognize that consolidated government accounts have led to 
some positive changes in behaviours and accounting practices. They perceive clear benefits of their 
use for macroeconomic policy making as well as for planning and maintenance of public sector assets. 
WGA-NZ was designed as an accounting information system to enable NZ Treasury to advise the 
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government on fiscal policy, provide a basis for forecasts, and on asset management (NZ2). Of the five 
countries studied, NZ interviewees were the most positive with respect to the usefulness of 
consolidated government accounts. Australia, on the other hand, had to embark on developing a new 
standard in an effort to reconcile statistical (GFS) and GAAP systems, by merging the dual bottom line 
approach into a single reporting framework (AASB 1049) in 2009 (Kober et al., 2013). AU2 claims that 
the new framework enables statistical and GAAP consolidation out-turns to be aligned more closely. 
 
As in the UK, national statistics are primarily used for macroeconomic fiscal policy decisions in Canada 
(CA1). All interviewees agree that the primary objective of consolidated public accounts of Canada is 
to enhance parliament’s ability to hold government to account, in accordance with the Financial 
Administration Act (1985), motivated by legitimacy concerns (Pollanen and Loiselle-Lapointe, 2012). 
Legitimacy was a central concern of CA5, who believes that Canadian PSAB standards are more useful 
than global standards, stating: “[IPSAS] are not as comprehensive or as high quality as PSAB … they 
[IPSAS board] are still trying to build legitimacy … that is much harder to do internationally than it is 
to do domestically … PSAB has been able to accomplish more simply because of its domestic focus”. 
Of the five countries, the Canadian system is the most diverse with little, if any, efforts to reconcile 
their inputs or outputs. 
 
While Swedish public sector accounting standards generally align with IFRS/IPSAS, consolidated 
government accounts boundaries are jurisdictionally defined, rather than reflective of IPSAS’ control 
principles (Bergmann et al., 2016). These standards are simpler than those in the UK and thus facilitate 
the implementation of consolidation (SE3). Swedish public sector accounting and audit functions are 
statutorily separated from the private sector, with public sector accountants and auditors precluded 
from ever holding private sector posts or professional memberships (SE1, SE2). Of the five countries, 
Swedish interviewees were the only ones to suggest that extensive consultations with academics 
positively shaped the development of consolidated government accounts, resulting in less conflicting 
understanding from statistical and GAAP out-turns.  
 
 
Discussion  
This study provides new insights on the users and usefulness of consolidated government accounts, 
building on Chow et al.’s (2015) findings. GAAP-based consolidated government accounts appear to 
have limited user appeal for some interviewees, but they nevertheless remain attractive for many 
reformers and auditors. The countries selected in this study have significant experience in their own 
national reforms and are also seen as global pioneers. Consolidated government accounts are 
appealing perhaps because they enable countries do to many things at once. Perceived internal 
decision-making inefficiencies, the lack of accountability, and the need to actively participate in 
shaping international ideas on public sector accounting are all reasons for reform. They are also seen 
as a logical ‘next step’ in some jurisdictions.  
 
The implementation of consolidated government accounts is subject to jurisdictional and political 
pressures, which necessitate localized interpretations (Hyndman and Lapsley, 2016; Hyndman and 
Liguori, 2016). Despite adopting universal principles, these adjustments dilute the intended benefits 
of their global comparability, which results in further calls for reform to safeguard their usefulness. 
For instance, control-based consolidation criteria vary in different countries (Grossi and Pepe, 2009; 
Heald and Georgiou, 2011; Caruana, 2016; Bergmann et al., 2016), and using control to define what is 
included in consolidated government accounts can be problematic, as governments are limited by the 
need to respect jurisdictional boundaries. Highly centralized countries, such as NZ and the UK, can 
more easily rationalize the need to consolidate nationwide. However, geographically dispersed 
countries with federal structures, such as Australia and Canada, are more limited in their scope to do 
likewise, because of their decentralized and autonomous jurisdictions.  
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In Australia, problems from the use of dual bottom line reporting appear to have affected use of GAAP 
consolidation for decision making; GAAP is seen primarily as a tool for financial reporting. In Canada, 
decentralized governmental and professional structures have led to heavy politicization of accounting 
reforms and challenges to institutional powers and influence. Consequently, there has not been the 
cross-jurisdictional consensus and cooperation needed to enable consolidation at the national level, 
or across provincial and municipal levels, despite some early interest (Dye and Bowsher, 1987). Given 
the ambiguity over their usefulness, extensive resources spent and sparse political support for many 
of the countries analysed, the main use of consolidated accounts is limited to accountability reporting 
for legislative compliance purposes, and/or functioning as a catalyst to spur improvements elsewhere 
in the public sector.  
 
Furthermore, this study reveals that users in some countries appear to be rhetorically constructed and 
difficult to pinpoint. The supportive political environment for consolidated government accounts in 
NZ is sui generis, nurtured by close links between government, academia and professional practice. 
This is not replicated in the UK and Australia, which have an established tradition of using 
macroeconomic data, seemingly appreciated by users such as politicians and credit ratings agencies. 
Sweden, on the other hand, is a de facto user of consolidation, benefiting from close links between 
academia and government (but not the accounting profession).  
 
Moreover, GAAP-based consolidated government accounts as a policy tool face substantial 
competition from other systems, such as government statistics and budgets. Extant systems have the 
benefit of significant historical usage on their side and have evolved to also incorporate some accruals 
and consolidated information. For instance, the UK’s Office for National Statistics started using some 
data from WGA-UK. The wide support for statistical systems stems from their universal comparability 
and acceptance for classifying government functions; whereas, cash-based budgetary systems have 
been the main accountability and policy decision tool used in countries before the adoption of accrual 
accounting. Therefore, actual uses are shaped by pre-existing private sector practices and the 
institutional contexts of different countries. Questions over the effectiveness of historical ex-post 
accounting systems for their intended ex-ante decision-making purposes raised by Jones et al. (2013) 
remain unanswered. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The manner in which consolidation boundaries are defined reflect conflicting forces at play, where 
attempts to make it more useful for economic comparisons clash with jurisdictional definitions of 
government boundaries. GAAP-based systems of consolidation that attempt to deal with this 
contradiction are less appealing than extant systems that focus on economic outcomes. Despite 
continuing ambiguity over the usefulness of consolidation for economic policy decision making, there 
are some wins where consolidation has revealed the limitations of existing approaches to reporting. 
The usefulness of consolidated government accounts can be improved if politicians are better 
incentivized and supported in using them, but this is predicated on the assumption that they can be 
made to give up their established preferred systems. The practical implication of this study is that it 
demonstrates an undiminished universal appeal of NPM-led government accounting reforms, despite 
long-standing observations that such reforms often struggle to identify actual users, and to adequately 
articulate their usefulness. 
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Impact 
Policy-makers and public officials need to be mindful of importing private sector accounting 
reforms, such as consolidation, to the public sector, or even from one public jurisdiction to another. 
Due to legal, regulatory, institutional, and cultural differences, they often require significant 
adaptation to fit the local context. Thus, their users and usefulness can vary, in spite of common 
rhetoric, impeding cross-jurisdictional comparability.  
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Table 1. Stakeholders interviewed 
Stakeholders Main topic of focus in interview or formal role of interviewee (broadly 
defined for anonymity) 
United Kingdom  
UK1 Government statistics function 
UK2 Treasury function 
UK3 Elected member of parliament 
UK4a Audit function 
UK4b Audit function 
UK5 Credit ratings 
  
Australia  
AU1 State Treasury function 
AU2 State Treasury function 
AU3 Credit ratings 
AU4 Budget function 
AU5 Elected member of parliament 
  
New Zealand  
NZ1 Government accounting function 
NZ2 Treasury function 
NZ3 Audit function  
NZ4 Big four accounting firm involvement with public sector standard setting 
NZ5 Credit ratings 
NZ6 Government statistics function 
  
Canada  
CA1 Government economic analysis 
CA2 Treasury accounting 
CA3 Comptrollership, involved in standard setting 
CA4 Provincial legislative audit 
CA5 Departmental audit, involved in standard setting 
CA6 Senior departmental administration 
  
Sweden  
SE1 Public sector accounting standard setter  
SE2 State auditor 
SE3 State auditor 
SE4 Government finance function (Regeringskansliet) 
SE5 Government finance function 
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Table 2. Consolidation boundaries and uses of consolidated financial statements  
Country Government 
expenditures 
and debt* 
Related legislation Level of 
consolidation 
Exclusions from 
consolidation  
Findings: Major 
uses (claimed 
and actual) 
United 
Kingdom 
• EPC $17,910  
• EGDP 43% 
• CETE 75% 
• DGDP 113% 
• Exchequer and Audit Departments Act (1866)–
establishes framework for Comptroller and 
Auditor Generals to hold the government 
accountable 
• Government Resources and Accounts Act 
(2000)–required creating a new body to provide 
advice and monitor implementation of WGA-UK 
• Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 
(2011)–provides the charter for Office of Budget 
Responsibility and structure for National Audit 
Office 
Single-tier, national 
consolidation 
entity: 
• central 
government 
• all local 
governments 
• public 
corporations 
 
• Parliament  
• National Audit Office 
• Nationalized banks 
• Royal Household  
• Macroeconomic 
policy decisions 
• Asset 
management 
• Accountability 
reporting 
• Financial 
planning 
Australia • EPC $17,483  
• EGDP 37% 
• CETE 62% 
• DGDP 44% 
• Charter of Budget Honesty Act (1998)–requires 
that Final Budget Outcome Report presents 
budget and fiscal outcomes for the fiscal year 
based on external reporting standards 
• Public Governance, Performance and 
Accountability Act (2013)–requires consolidated 
financial statements in accordance with 
Australian Accounting Standard AASB 1049, 
Whole-of-Government and General Government 
Sector Financial Reporting. 
Three-tier 
consolidation, 
multiple entities: 
• Commonwealth 
(federal) 
government 
• 6 states and 2 
territorial 
governments  
• all local 
government 
municipalities 
• No consolidation for 
the whole of Australia 
as a single entity 
• All governments 
within and between 
tiers have their own 
separate consolidations 
• Compliance 
reporting 
• Accountability 
reporting 
(transparency) 
• Reconciliation 
of GAAP-reports 
with Global 
Finance Statistics 
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New 
Zealand  
 
 
 
 
 
 
• EPC $14,891  
• EGDP 40% 
• CETE 89% 
• DGDP 36% 
• Public Finance Act (1989)–requires 
consolidated Crown reports 
• Financial Reporting Act (1993)–adopted 
sector-neutral financial reporting standards for 
the public and private sectors (applied from 
1993 to 2013) 
• Fiscal Responsibility Act (1994)–requires the 
government to publish regular statements of 
forward estimates of its short-term and long-
term fiscal strategy 
Two-tier 
consolidation, 
multiple entities: 
• central 
government 
(including Crown 
entities and state-
owned enterprises) 
• local authorities; 
but only to the 
extent of control 
within local 
municipality 
boundaries. 
• No consolidation for 
the whole of New 
Zealand as a single 
entity 
• Central government 
consolidation does not 
include local 
government entities 
• Macroeconomic 
policy decisions 
• Asset 
management 
• Financial 
planning and 
forecasting 
• Credit ratings 
(along with 
statistical data) 
Canada • EPC $18,167  
• EGDP 41% 
• CETE 25%  
• DGDP 98% 
• Constitution Act (1867)–sets federal and 
provincial responsibilities 
• Financial Administration Act (1985)–requires 
annual Public Accounts of Canada to be tabled 
in Parliament (plus each province has its own 
Act) 
• Federal Accountability Act (2006)–bestows 
financial management responsibility and 
accountability on federal deputy ministers 
Three-tier 
consolidation, 
multiple entities: 
• federal 
government 
• 10 provincial and 3 
territorial 
governments  
• all municipalities 
• No consolidation for 
the whole of Canada as 
a single entity 
• All governments 
within and between 
tiers have their own 
separate consolidations 
• Government business 
enterprises excluded at 
all three levels 
• Accountability 
reporting to 
Parliament 
• Meeting 
legislative and 
PSAB 
requirements 
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Sweden • EPC $24,003  
• EGDP 50%  
• CETE 38% 
• DGDP 53% 
• Budget Act (2011)–sets requirements for 
budget policy, investments, financing, auditing, 
and accountability reporting by the central 
government 
• Swedish Local Government Act (1992)– 
regulates municipal boundaries and determines 
organization and powers of municipalities and 
county councils 
 
Two-tier 
consolidation, 
multiple entities: 
• central 
government 
• all local 
governments 
• No consolidation for 
the whole of Sweden as 
a single entity 
• Central government 
consolidation separately 
from individual local 
governments 
consolidations 
• Government-owned 
enterprises and pension 
funds excluded 
• Compliance 
reporting 
• Supplement to 
budget for fiscal 
policy decisions  
• Framework for 
governance and 
internal control 
 
*Source: OECD (2017, pp. 63, 75, 81). EPC = 2015 total government expenditures per capita (in US$); EGDP = 2015 total government expenditures 
as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); CETE = 2015 central government expenditures as percentage of total government expenditures; 
DGDP = 2015 total government gross debt as percentage of GDP. 
 
